In this paper we provide a critical analysis of the concept of hegemonic masculinity.
This paper focuses on the discursive strategies involved in negotiating membership of gender categories. Specifically, we are interested in how men position themselves in relation to conventional notions of the masculine. How do men take on the social identity of 'being a man' as they talk, and what are the implications of the typical discursive paths they follow? We concentrate on responses to interview questions such as "Would you describe yourself as a masculine man?" and "Are there moments in everyday life when you feel more masculine than at other times?", and on men's responses to magazine photographs of possible role models. To help make sense of these moments of self-assessment and identification, we introduce notions of 'imaginary positions' and 'psycho-discursive practices' and initiate a dialogue with the feminist sociology of masculinity developed by Robert Connell and his colleagues (Carrigan et al., 1985; Connell, 1987; .
According to Connell, the task of 'being a man' involves taking on and negotiating 'hegemonic masculinity'. Men's identity strategies are constituted through their complicit or resistant stance to prescribed dominant masculine styles. Connell's (1987) analysis of this process of identification is an anti-essentialist one. He argues that masculine characters are not given. Rather, a range of possible styles and personae emerge from the gender regimes found in different cultures and historical periods. Among the possible variety of ways of being masculine, however, some become 'winning styles' and it is these with which men must engage.
Connell's conception of hegemony draws on Gramsci's (1971) depiction of the wars of position and manoeuvre characteristic of social formations. Hegemonic ideologies preserve, legitimate and naturalise the interests of the powerful -marginalising and subordinating the claims of other groups. Hegemony is not automatic, however, but involves contest and constant struggle. Hegemonic masculinity, Connell argues, is centrally connected to the subordination of women. It is a way of being masculine which not only marginalises and subordinates women's activities but also alternative forms of masculinity such as 'camp' or effeminate masculinity. Typically, it also involves the brutal repression of the activities of gay men and their construction as a despised 'Other'.
Connell's formulation of hegemonic masculinity and men's complicity or resistance has a number of advantages. First, this approach allows for diversity. Masculine identities can be studied in the plural rather than in the singular. Second, this is an analysis deeply attentive to the problematic of gender power. Finally, Connell's work notes the relevance of relations between men as well as relations between men and women for the formation of gendered identities. This approach has proved particularly useful for understanding the broad social context of gender relations. It also serves as a useful back-cloth for social psychological analyses (Wetherell and Edley, 1998) . We want to argue, however, that the notion of hegemonic masculinity is not sufficient for understanding the nitty gritty of negotiating masculine identities and men's identity strategies. In effect, Connell leaves to one side the question of how the forms he identifies actually prescribe or regulate men's lives. Men might "conform" to hegemonic masculinity, but we are left to wonder what this conformity might look in practice. Moreover, this is not just a case of developing a 'micro' psychological analysis to bolt on to the 'macro' sociological picture. The patterns we find when we look in detail at men's negotiation of masculine identities have some important implications for the more general sociological account.
Connell's account of the processes involved in the social and psychological reproduction of hegemonic masculinity is sketchy. He argues that hegemonic masculinity is not intended as a description of real men. Hegemonic masculinity is not a personality type or an actual male character. Rather, it is an ideal or set of prescriptive social norms, symbolically represented, but a crucial part of the texture of many routine mundane social and disciplinary activities. The exact content of the prescriptive social norms which make up hegemonic masculinity is left unclear. It tends in Connell's writings to be correlated with what might be called macho masculinity and exemplified by fictional characters in films such as Rambo, Rocky and the Terminator. It is also unclear whether there is only one hegemonic strategy at any point in time or whether hegemonic strategies can vary across different parts of a social formation, creating conflicts or tensions for individual men between different hegemonic forms as they move across social practices.
Hegemonic masculinity is presented in Connell's work as an aspirational goal rather than a lived reality for ordinary men. Indeed a key characteristic seems to be its 'impossibility' or 'phantastic' nature (c.f. Frosh, 1994) . No living man is ever man enough by this reckoning and this transcendent and unattainable quality gives hegemonic masculinity regulatory force. Connell argues that most men are complicit with hegemonic masculinity, even if they are unable to (or refrain from) strutting like Rambo, since they benefit from the dominant definition both as a source of fantasy gratification and, more practically, through the systematic subordination of women.
As social psychologists, however, we wonder about the appropriateness of a definition of dominant masculinity which no man may actually ever embody. What does it say, for example, about the concept of hegemonic masculinity when some of the most institutionally powerful men in the UK, like Tony Blair and Gordon Brown (the current Prime Minister and Chancellor of Great Britain), could also be described as non-hegemonic in terms of personal style (c.f. also Donaldson, 1993)? There is, therefore, a lack of specification on how hegemonic masculinity might The ambiguities are compounded by the relative absence of detailed empirical research on masculine styles (although see Edley and Wetherell, 1997; in press; Gough, 1998; Willott and Griffin, 1997 ). Connell's (1995) own work on life history is mainly concerned with categorising groups of men into types dependent on their shared collective positioning in relation to gendered practices. What is missing is more fine-grain work on what complicity and resistance look like in practice.
Investigations are required of how men negotiate regulatory conceptions of masculinity in their everyday interactions as they account for their actions and produce or manage their own (and others') identities.
Our examination in this paper is part of a broader project to develop a critical discursive psychology of masculinity (Edley and Wetherell, 1996; Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell and Edley, 1998) . We chose discourse as a site for investigating men's identities because we are persuaded of the central role discursive practices play in the constitution of subjectivity. That is, what it means to be a person, the formulation of an internal life, an identity and a way of being in the world develop as external public dialogue moves inside to form the 'voices of the mind' (Wertsch, 1991) . Subjectivity and identity are best understood as the personal enactment of communal methods of self accounting, vocabularies of motive, culturally recognisable emotional performances and available stories for making sense (Shotter, 1984; Gergen, 1994; Harre and Gillett, 1994) . Discursive practices are also a pervasive and constitutive element in all social practices -materially effective and the core of social action.
Our approach to discursive psychology (Billig, 1991; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Harre and Gillett, 1994; Potter and Wetherell, 1987) and to the actual analysis of discourse draws upon and treads between two competing theoretical "camps". It has been common-place in recent years to distinguish between a fine-grain form of discursive psychology influenced by conversation analysis and a more global form of analysis derived from post-structuralism (Burr, 1995; Parker, 1992; Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995) . We suggest that such a bifurcation has been a mistake and an adequate discursive psychology needs a more eclectic base.
When people speak their talk reflects, not only the local pragmatics of that particular conversational context, but also much broader or more global patterns in collective sense-making and understanding. It would seem appropriate, therefore, to adopt a similarly two-sided analytical approach, combining insights from the ethnomethodological/conversation tradition (see, for example, Antaki, 1988; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995) , with those stemming from poststructuralist and Foucauldian-influenced notions of discourse (see Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Hollway, 1984; Parker and Shotter, 1990) . From the former we take the emphasis on the action orientation (Heritage, 1984 ) of people's talk and the notion of social order as constituted intersubjectively as participants display to each other their understanding of what is going on, while from the latter we take the notion of discourse as organised by 'institutionally forms of intelligibility' (Shapiro, 1992) which have a history and which imbricate power relations (see Wetherell, 1998 , for the explication and justification of this two-sided discursive psychology).
We suggest that this new synthetic approach to discourse analytical work within psychology best captures the paradoxical relationship that exists between discourse and the speaking subject. It allows us to embrace the fact that people are, at the same time, both the products and the producers of language (Billig, 1991) . In this paper, our focus is on the relatively global strategies of self-positioning men adopt across quite large stretches of discourse and in the regularities across a sample rather than within one or two conversations.
Materials and Procedures
The materials for this analysis come from a series of 30 tape-recorded and transcribed interviews conducted between April 1992 and March 1993 with a total of 61 men.
The participants for these discussions were men who, at the time, were undertaking various foundation courses with the Open University. As is typical of this student group, the men came from a diverse range of occupational backgrounds with a variety of previous educational qualifications, including men who had left school with no qualifications and men who had other university experience. They ranged in age from 20 to 64. All were volunteers who have been given pseudonyms.
A typical discussion group consisted of the interviewer (Nigel Edley) and two volunteers, although some sessions involved three volunteers and others just one.
Lasting, on average, around ninety minutes each, the discussions covered issues selected by the interviewer from a range of different topics, including sexuality and relationships, images of men in popular culture and feminism and social change. In a number of the interviews, various photographs of men taken from Arena magazine were presented to the participants and used as a basis for discussion (see Appendix A). In general, the aim of the interviewer was to create an informal atmosphere where, to a large extent, the participants themselves directed the flow of conversation.
For the analysis below, a file of all relevant conversations was created from the transcripts and read and re-read for recurring and collectively shared patterns in selfpositioning. All of the extracts presented below come with a "post-script" identifying the place in the data-base from which the material is taken. For example, "(OU14: 21-23)" represents an extract taken from pages 21 to 23 of the transcript for the fourteenth group of Open University volunteers (see Appendix B for a brief note on transcription notation).
In this paper we will not be concerned with the fine detail of the discursive and rhetorical work evident in the specimen extracts we cite. Our analysis focuses on the broad patterns evident in the data file which are representative of the discourse of the sample as a whole. We conceptualise these broad patterns as 'practical ideologies' (Wetherell et al., 1987) or as familiar interpretative resources and methods of self accounting which are available to these men to be versionned as appropriate when faced with various discursive demands. The interview is, of course, a highly specific discursive situation where the interviewer's own discourse and construction of the issues is influential in setting the local context. Complete analysis needs to be attentive to this and other immediate contextual and interactional features. We contend, however, that the broad methods of self-accounting we identify here have a generality outside the interview context and in this sense are robust phenomena.
Negotiating Positions
Here we compare three contrasting, although not entirely unrelated, procedures participants adopted for describing themselves in relation to the social position of being a man. In commenting on these patterns we develop the notion of 'imaginary positions'.
Heroic Positions
The first pattern conforms most closely to that predicted by writings on hegemonic masculinity and could be seen as a good exemplification of Connell's notion of complicity. Indeed, it could be read as an attempt to actually instantiate hegemonic masculinity since, here, men align themselves strongly with conventional ideals.
In Extract 1, Michael, a 26 year old, white, computer software designer and keen amateur boxer is responding to a question about feeling masculine in everyday life.
He develops an anecdote about a recent work presentation as an example of something which might fit the interviewer's terms. In his account he positions himself in a strongly positive way. He describes the "buzz" of being in control, of "dictating the flow", and meeting the challenge in a potentially risky and challenging situation.
This production of self appears to be highly invested (see Hall, 1996 for a further discussion of the notion of investment).
Extract 1 NIGEL:
Okay some people say that (.) you know (.) there's moments in their everyday lives when they feel more masculine than at other times.
(.) Is there anything that either of you could think of (.) In Extract 2, Simon, a 30 year old white electrician, is responding to the interviewer's question about regional differences in being macho -is the North of Britain more macho than the South? In developing the argument that Northern men like to feel they are more manly than Southern men he describes his experience of working down South, going into pubs with a gang of contractors and showing those Southerners how to drink. The description of self within this anecdote, like Michael's, aligns self initially at least with a conventional masculine ideal and in those terms produces an exalted or heroic self. when you go down there (.) you know how we were saying that in the army your sort of (.) everybody's in there and in isolation (.) you're self contained whereas sometimes if we're working in London or in Kent or somewhere like that you would go out and you almost feel like (.) you know (.) right we're an invading army like (.) a load of contractors going out for a few bevies and you know (.) showing these southerners how to drink (.) so I think (.) in reality the southerners are no more wimps than we are (.) but there is a bit of a (PAUL: North-South rivalry) yeah (.) we like to think that we're more manly possibly than them (OU2: 9-10)
The final example comes from an interview with Graham, a 24 year old, white accountant, unemployed at the time of the interview, who plays rugby at an amateur level. In this extract, following a long conversation about the role of rugby in Graham's sense of masculinity the interviewer asks him to explain himself -how is it possible to enjoy playing such a violent game? In response Graham produces an account of his life as a prop forward which again constructs and draws on a heroic, invested, mostly unreflexive and conventionally masculine self.
Extract 3
NIGEL: But I imagine some people listening to you who don't play the game particularly (.) well almost exclusively (.) are gonna say erm (.) you know you're talking about (.) you're talking about not only punching people (.) not only head-butting (.) not only erm getting cuts and giving them erm you're (.) you're experiencing that as a matter of (.) of course every weekend (.) right? (.) erm and (.) and yet you sound (.) you know (.) as if you really love it? (GRAHAM: Yeah) now for someone who doesn't play the game (.) imagine someone coming over from another country where they don't play rugby (.) they're gonna say 'How on earth can you enjoy that?' (GRAHAM: Yeah) I mean that's the most amazing thing that you could subject yourself to that and subject someone else to it.
GRAHAM: But as you said it goes (.) you used the word sort of a trial of (.) I can't think what you said (.) (NIGEL: Courage) a challenge (.) a trial of courage (.) and that's what it comes down to (.) it comes down to you're pitting yourself against (.) in the scrum situation which is where I'm saying a lot of the stuff goes on (.) you're pitting yourself against one man erm (.) albeit you've got (.) you know you've got the whole pack behind you (.) pushing (.) but in sort of (.) in technique and in sort of (.) as I say (.) the kidology of it and whatever (.) you've got basically one against one there and erm (.) in I mean to a certain extent (.) I mean (.) I would say this but the props are a very important part of the ballwinning process and you maybe think you've got a lot of status in that (.) possibly a lot of people who watch the game don't think that (.) they think that the game's won and lost by (NIGEL: Outside) yeah (.) the scrum half or whatever (.) but erm (.) I know (.) I can say that I think props are very important and my hooker'll say 'No, you're just there to hold me up (.) I do the work' (NIGEL: Sure) or whatever (.) but you do in yourself (.) you have a sort of self importance and you do (.) and you enjoy the challenge and (.) if you're (.) excuse the term (.) dicked about in the front row erm by the opposition (.) you aren't gonna stand for that (OU5: 13-14)
Although these segments of talk were produced by different people and contain a variety of discursive and rhetorical work, what groups them together is that each involves a particular production of self (among other productions of self) as part of a description of an episode (giving a presentation, going to the pub, playing rugby).
This production of self is difficult to describe but involves investment (these are valued and emotionally charged self-presentations) where there is a coincidence between self and some heroic masculine persona. This method for self-presentation can be distinguished from other forms of description or autobiographical commentary which involve, for instance, less or no coincidence between self and self-description such as the splitting of self into a character and a voice which comments critically or 'objectively' on oneself (i.e. on what 'I am like'). As noted earlier, the involved or invested self-descriptions in this case conform to key elements in descriptions of hegemonic masculinity (e.g. man as courageous, physically tough and yet able to keep his cool).
One way of describing the pattern of identification occurring in these extracts is through the notion of imaginary positioning. Such positioning, which has been outlined in general terms in the work of Barthes and Lacan (c.f. Moriarty, 1991) , is relatively common-place in discourse, especially when people take on socially sanctioned images of ideal selves. For Lacan what is characteristic of the symbolic order, of discourse, is the constant creation of illusory subjects. As the human subject speaks, s/he produces herself or himself as full, complete, describable, as coincident with an image, as a fictional unity. In the symbolic, as we begin to utter, the self becomes a character, endowed with substance and unity as we say "I...", "I...", "I...". This process of taking on a character is seen as illusory by Lacan and Barthes because, in their view, it mistakes the actual nature of subjectivity, its restless, incomplete and distributed nature. It is also a false authorship since what feels like authentic self-production, original self-expression and self description is always ready-made, always social first and personal second. It is a selection from the panoply of selves already available to be donned. An external voice from without is thus mispresented as a voice from within.
In developing this argument Lacan, and later Barthes, are making a general epistemological claim about the nature of discourse and subjectivity. Our aim in borrowing this notion of imaginary positions is to treat it in a somewhat different way; as an empirical phenomenon where the issue of how self description and identification are accomplished in talk remains an open question. It may prove more useful to reserve the notion of imaginary positions for a specific set of appearances of the "I" in talk rather than all instances of self description. However, we wish to note here that imaginary positioning is one way in which identification with the masculine is achieved and, when it is heroic, as in Extracts 1 to 3, this mode of identification fleshes out what might be meant by complicity with hegemonic masculinity.
Significantly, heroic masculine imaginary positioning was quite a rare event within our data. For the most part, it was not the principal method by which the men interviewed constructed themselves as masculine. This might seem surprising given that men's claims to power and authority appear so firmly bound up with the heroic.
However, its rarity becomes more understandable when seen in ethnomethodological terms; participants may try out self-exalting strategies but they also have an interest in doing "being normal" (perhaps especially in a research interview) where normality includes procedures for presenting oneself which manage narcissism, keeping it in check through a mixture of modesty work, self deprecation, and so on. PHILLIP: Er (.)
MARTIN: Well that's not how I see it (.) no (.) it depends through which eyes it's being seen (.) isn't it? (.) I mean if somebody likes Rambo
(.) they would see that as being ultra-masculine wouldn't they? (OU7: 5-6) Stereotypes are one among many social psychological concepts which appear both in lay and academic discourse. Experience with other data sets (Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Wetherell, 1996) suggests that such discourse is likely to emerge in contexts where people are asked to reflexively consider their place in society. Often, the social or the cultural realm is formulated as 'just stereotypes', in other words, as artificial, At first sight it could be argued that the procedures evident in Extracts 4 to 6 for dealing with self-positioning in relation to masculinity are a good example of what could be classed as resistance to hegemonic masculinity. There are elements here of a critique of macho styles and a distinct separation of self from what could be specified as hegemonic or dominant. In contrast to this conclusion we would argue that the organisation of the stereotype repertoire with its emphasis on individualism, autonomy and rationality is not necessarily a challenge to gendered power relations, since it can also be seen as buying back into another well-established aspect of a dominant masculine ideal (see Seidler, 1989; . Our point is not so much that what initially looked like resistance turns out to be another form of complicity. Rather our argument is that a simple dichotomy between resistant and complicit practices is not sufficiently subtle to capture the complex production of gendered selves which occurs in men's talk. This is a point to which we will return later in the discussion.
Rebellious Positions
The third and final pattern evident in the transcripts also looks superficially like resistance to hegemonic masculinity. Again, we wish to take a more qualified perspective here. In this pattern men define themselves in terms of their unconventionality and the imaginary positions involve the flaunting of social expectations.
In Extract 7, Sam a white, 42 year old psychiatric nurse manager and Harry, a white, 53 year old brick-layer, are responding to the interviewer's standard questions. Harry's response is straight-forward or matter-of-fact but Sam makes the distinction, already noted in other extracts, between being masculine and being a "macho man". He describes himself variously in the course of the extract as comfortable with his male identity, as secure in relation to it and as having "all sides" to his personality. In response to the interviewer's probing about the nature of security and insecurity, Sam produces an account of himself as unembarrassed by taking on activities which are constructed as unusual for his gender, such as knitting and cooking. He appears to be invested in such unconventionality. A similar pattern can be seen in Extracts 8, 9 and 10 below in which Dave, a 39 year old, white, manager of a timber company, responds first to a discussion with other participants about whether it is masculine to wear jewellery and then, in Extracts 9 and 10, to a debate about the effects of sixties pop culture on men's clothes and appearance. What is striking about these examples of rejecting macho masculinity is that they involve a highly privatised or individualised rebellion. Uniformly, unconventionality is understood as a character trait rather than a political strategy. Furthermore, this character trait is understood in standard humanistic psychological terms as a matter of feeling good about oneself. It is about feeling comfortable, a case of being so wellintegrated as a human being that one is not afraid to act in terms of personal preferences. Once again, just like the construction of Mr Average, being a gender non-conformist trades upon the hegemonic values of autonomy and independence. As a consequence, what is being celebrated in this discourse is not so much knitting, cooking and crying per se, but the courage, strength and determination of these men as men to engage in these potentially demeaning activities.
Discussion
This paper has described three distinct and highly regular procedures for selfpositioning found among a diverse sample of men. The first of these procedures suggests a relatively straightforward basis to the reproduction of male power as men act out and take on some of the imaginary characters conventionally associated with hegemonic masculinity. The two remaining procedures suggest a more mixed pattern which could either undercut or bolster male power (or do both) depending on the social circumstances in which they are instantiated. There are some positive as well as negative indications here from a feminist point of view. Some men do appear to be abandoning macho masculinity. Yet their alternative identities give emphasis to characteristics which have in the past also worked in gender oppressive ways such as authoritativeness, rationality and independence. Thus the rebellious positions could be used as a sanction for new social practices and yet they are also used here to celebrate autonomy from social conventions, where this autonomy can be heard, not just as a legacy of liberal Enlightenment discourse, but as a mode of representation long colonised by men (c.f. Seidler, 1989; .
What are the implications of our analysis for the concept of hegemonic masculinity?
Connell argues that gender power is reproduced in oppressive forms because men are complicit with hegemonic masculinity understood as an aspirational and largely unreachable set of social norms and ideals. Most men, Connell suggests, can never personally embody hegemonic masculinity but they support it, are regulated by it, and use it to judge other men's conduct.
What seems worth keeping from this account is the notion of hegemonic forms of intelligibility -the notion that men's conduct is regulated by shared forms of sense making which are consensual although contested, maintain male privilege, which are largely taken for granted, and which are highly invested. What we can't accept, however, is the common assumption that hegemonic masculinity is just one style or there is just one set of ruling ideas (most often understood as macho masculinity).
Rather, there is a multiplicity of hegemonic sense-making relevant to the construction of masculinity identities, and in addition these forms of sense-making do not always seem to regulate through their unreachable and aspirational status. Sense-making is complex, contradictory and full of competing claims and dilemmas (Billig et al., 1989) . Furthermore, we suggest that we need a much more detailed account of the psychology involved. It is not sufficient to say, for example, that hegemonic masculinity is reproduced because men conform to social norms. We need a more elaborated account of what we mean by 'norms' and of the process of 'take-up' of those norms.
To address these points in turn. As we noted, one of the surprising findings from our research is how infrequently in relative terms our sample engaged in heroic masculinity -that is tried out the highly invested imaginary positions encapsulating the key characteristics usually attributed to hegemonic masculinity (strength, boldness, winning challenges, cool toughness, etc). More commonly men portrayed themselves as 'ordinary' in relation to a macho stereotype dismissed as extreme, over the top, a caricature, seen as a sign of immaturity, and as a sign of a man who had not developed his own personal style or who was not comfortable with who he was.
Yet we would not want to conclude from this that these 'ordinary' men are beyond gender power simply because they do not seem (in this discursive moment) to aspire to the most common definition of hegemonic masculinity. Instead, paradoxically, one could say that sometimes one of the most effective ways of being hegemonic, or being a 'man', may be to demonstrate one's distance from hegemonic masculinity. Perhaps what is most hegemonic is to be non-hegemonic! -an independent man who knows his own mind and who can 'see through' social expectations. What seems to be happening here is that the realm of hegemonic masculinity can not be sealed off from other hegemonic ways of being a person in Western societies such as demonstrating individuality and autonomy from social forces. These different requirements for how to be a man are in conflict and are a potential source of ideological dilemmas. In everyday talk, recognised social ideals (such as macho man) can act both as a source for invested identity and as an 'Other' to position oneself against. This confusionmen may be most involved in reproducing the hegemonic when they position themselves against the hegemonic masculine ideal -is resolved if we accept that the organised forms of intelligbility which make up the hegemonic in any particular social site and period are multiple, varied and much more complex than current accounts of hegemonic masculinity suggest.
The men we interviewed were engaged in accomplishing a wide variety of identity positions. They were simultaneously constructing themselves as reasonable human beings, as individuals with certain reputations and histories and (usually) as cooperative and willing research subjects. Most discursive situations require this kind of attentiveness to multiple positioning. It would be interesting to examine the occasions when pressures to be a good Enlightenment liberal individual, for instance, enforce, intensify and sometimes contradict gendered self-presentations. On some occasions, claiming hegemonic masculinity can offend against and clash too strongly with other valued modes of self-presentation. A focus simply on this mode of self-presentation is too narrow, therefore, when we try for a complete understanding of what it currently means to be a man.
Connell's account of the discursive/ideological field is thus too neat. We need to consider the multiple and inconsistent discursive resources available for constructing hegemonic gender identities, and, second, we need to allow for the possibility that complicity and resistance can be mixed together. We suggested that it would be difficult to describe the men we interviewed as either complicit or resistant. Indeed, it would be more useful analytically to see complicity and resistance not in either/or terms. It is probably more useful to re-position complicity or resistance as labels to describe the effects of discursive strategies mobilised in contexts as opposed to labels for types of individual men.
Connell in his work leaves vague the question of whether hegemonic masculinity is a relative position in a discursive field or a particular content and set of representations.
No doubt this is left vague because it is both. But in our view most emphasis needs to be placed on the exact mobilisation of accounts within a discursive field rather than on sematic content defined a priori. Hegemony is a version of the world which is reality defining. Such versions are plural, inconsistent, achieved through discursive work, constantly needing to brought into being over and over again. That is the chief character of hegemony rather than its definition as an already known and fixed set of ruling ideas. It is a relative position in a struggle for taken for grantedness. This is not to advocate, however, political quietism, or to suggest that feminist struggles against unequal social relations should be abandoned because practical ideologies turn out to be more chaotic, complex and fragmented than previous theory imagined. Indeed we think there are a number of advantages to focusing on the effects of discursive practices when developing feminist political strategies for the ideological domain. First, such an approach suggests the realistic scope for change and indicates further potential for practical and persuasive political rhetoric. The rebellious and ordinary positions are mixed, we noted. Their effectivity does depend on their mobilisation. We do need to be more cautious, we can't conclude that the battle is won because men in some contexts admit to 'being comfortable with their feminine side', and we can't see all manner of positive omens in men's construction of macho masculinity as a caricature, but it is also possible to imagine how the familiar and seemingly acceptable repertoires of liberal humanism and heroic individual rebellion might be re-worked in combination with other discourses to produce persuasive new imaginary positions for men. Such an approach fits well with Lynne Segal's (1990) emphasis on a feminist politics based on dealing with shades of grayrecognising the positive as well as the negative elements in the diverse social practices which constitute men and masculinity (see also Connell, 1995) .
To turn to our second main theme. We have also tried to elaborate in this paper a model of the social psychological process involved in identification with hegemonic forms of sense-making -a dimension we suggested was left ambiguous in Connell's work. First, we propose that Connell's norms are in fact discursive practices. Second, we suggest that identification is a matter of the procedures in action through which men live/talk/do masculinity and as we have tried to demonstrate these procedures are intensely local (situationally realised) and global (dependent on broader conditions of intelligibility). They represent the social within the psychological. Such members' methods (in ethnomethodological terminology) are part of a kit bag of recognisable ways of self-presentation which are available to competent members of society and which always need to be accomplished in context (worked up in this case to deal with the language game of being interviewed). What we mean by character or identity is partly the differential, persistent and idiosyncratic inflection of these procedures over time in the course of a life.
These procedures are a particular class of discursive practice which we call psychodiscursive. Psycho-discursive practices occur in talk (hence discursive) and also implicate a psychology. They construct a psychology in the sense that through the momentary and more sustained use of these procedures men acquire a vocabulary of motives and a character with particular emotions, desires, goals and ambitions (see Edwards, 1997 for a more elaborated account of this premise of discursive psychology). Such practices are thus also self-formative or onto-formative in the sense described by Foucault (Rose, 1996) . The man, for instance, who describes himself as original, as beyond stereotypes, as having a personal worked out philosophy of masculinity or indeed as just ordinary and average has not escaped the familiar tropes of gender. He is precisely enmeshed by convention; subjectified, ordered and disciplined at the very moment he rehearses the language of personal taste, unconventionality and autonomy, or ordinariness and normality.
The notion, then, of the imaginary positioning of self as one typical psycho-discursive practice provides a concrete route into specifying and then studying the norms which make up hegemonic masculinity. It specifies an empirical site for investigation and can explain the conundrum of men who appear to be both hegemonic and nonhegemonic, complicit and resistant at the same time. In addition this is a reformulation which (through the broader theory of discursive psychology) begins to explain the process of 'take-up' and the reproduction of the social in the psychological.
It is a formulation which allows the investigation of varied content across social sites and thus pluralises the concept of hegemonic masculinity. Some of the ambiguities in the notion of hegemonic masculinity noted earlier can thus be resolved. It could be argued that the concept has been particularly influential precisely because of its elasticity and lack of specificity and this may still be so for large-scale sociological, cultural, anthropological and historical investigations of forms of masculinity but not, we think, for social psychological analysis.
